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Standards of Willfulness Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
The statutes of limitations facing plaintiffs who bring actions
under the Fair Labor Standards Act 1 [FLSA] vary, depending upon
the willfulness of the violation. The Act establishes two limitations:
three years for willful violations, and two years for nonwillful violations. 2 It does not, however, define willfulness, and federal courts
have interpreted the concept in two very different ways. Under the
more prevalent rule, the test is: "Did the employer know the FLSA
was in the picture?"3 But other courts have been more guarded, reserving the longer limitations period for "violations which are intentional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental." 4
These two interpretations have markedly different ramifications.
Under the broad approach, an employer's knowledge that the FLSA
may apply makes any violation willful; good faith does not negate
willfulness, and thus most FLSA violations remain actionable
throughout a three-year limitations period. The narrow interpretation, in contrast, requires some evil intent by the employer, so that a
demonstration of good faith is enough to trigger the briefer limitation. This Note studies the relative merits of the two approaches
courts have taken toward interpreting "willfulness" under the FLSA.
It evaluates them by reference to the history of the limitations provision, concluding that the restrictive approach is more consonant with
Congress's purpose in establishing a two-tiered statute of limitations.
The classic expression of the broad interpretation came in Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc. s In that case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a district court's holding that, in signing a collective bargaining
agreement exempting it from paying the FLSA overtime rate, Jiffy
June had willfully violated the FLSA even though the company had
I. 29 u.s.c. § 255 (1976).
2. The Act provides:
Any action . . . to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ...
(a) ... may be co=enced within twi> years after the cause of action accrued, and
every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the
cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may
be co=enced within three years after the cause of action accrued.
29 u.s.c. § 255 (1976).
3. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d I 139, 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
948 (1972).
4. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
5. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). The Department of Labor
and employees of Jiffy June Farms sued under the FLSA for overtime pay allegedly due the
employees. Before August, 1966, Jiffy June had properly paid the employees' overtime com•
pensation. The Company then agreed to a collective bargaining agreement purportedly ex•
empting it from paying the FLSA overtime rate. 458 F.2d at I 139.
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acted reasonably and in good faith. 6 The appellate court stated:
The entire legislative history of the 1966 amendments of the FLSA
indicates a liberalizing intention on the part of Congress. Requiring
employers to have more than awareness of the possible applicability of
the FLSA would be inconsistent with that intent. Consequently, we
hold that employer's decision to change his employee's rate of pay in
violation ofFLSA is ''willful" when, as in this case, there is substantial
evidence in the record to support a finding that the employer knew or
suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA. Stated most simply
we think the test should be: Did the employer know the FLSA was in
the picture?7

Jtffy June has received widespread acceptance. The First and
Fourth Circuits, 8 and district courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits,9 have all endorsed the broad test. And within the
6. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 664, 670-71 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
7. 458 F.2d at 1142.
8. For First Circuit cases applying J[//y June, see Dunlop v. New Hampshire Jockey Club,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 416, 423-24 (D.N.H. 1976) (holding that the defendant's awareness of the
Act subjected him to the three-year limitations period), revd on other grounds sub nom. Marshall v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 562 F.2d 1323 (1st Cir. 1977); Dunlop v. Rhode
Island, 398 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.R.I. 1975) (holding that an earlier action against the defendant brought under the FLSA by other employees demonstrated that the defendant was
aware of the possible applicability of the FLSA). For Fourth Circuit decisions applying the
JtlfyJune test, see Marshall v. Elks Club, 444 F. Supp. 957,968 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Brennan v.
Air Terminal Parking, 72 Lab. Cas. 46,205, 46,213 (D.S.C. 1973) (holding that the employer's
assertion of an exemption under the Act established that the employer knew that the "FLSA
was in the picture"), ajfd, 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974).
9. Fordecisions in the Second and Third.Circuits applying theJ[//yJune test, see Marshall
v. Sam Dell's Dodge Corp., 451 F. Supp. 294, 305 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that defendant
knew that the "Act was in the picture" because of two earlier investigations by the Labor
Department into the defendant's employment practices); Bailey v. Pilots' Assn. for Bay &
River Delaware, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that the defendant knew
that the "Act was in the picture" because certain employees had previously asked about the
minimum wage and the defendant had discussed the matter with counsel).
Courts in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are divided between broad and narrow readings of
willfulness. For decisions in the Sixth Circuit applying J[//y June, see Usery v. Godwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1267 (W.D. Mich. 1976) (the court stated that the violations
''were committed by the defendants knowingly . . . and were committed with at least a general
awareness that the requirements of the law were in the picture; and nothing more is required to
establish that violations were willful"); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 407 F.
Supp. 1090, 1094 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (concluding that "[A]n employer acts willfully . . . if he
knows or has reason to know that his conduct is governed by the Act. Neither a good faith
belief in the lawfulness of his wage and overtime regulations nor ignorance of their invalidity
shields the employer from the additional year of liability"), remanded on other grounds, 565
F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871
(E.D. Tenn. 1973), ajfd, 509 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1975). For decisions in the Sixth Circuit not
applying the J[//y June standard, see Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. I 166, 1194
(N.D. Ohio 1979) (the court referred to both standards and held that the defendant's violation
was willful even under a restrictive interpretation of the word); Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc.,
473 F. Supp. 465, 480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing both tests and holding that the defendant's
violations were willful even under the minority rule); Pezzillo v. General Tel. & Elec. Info.
Sys., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1257, 1269 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (citing both standards without distinguishing between them or adopting either), ajfd, 572 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1978); Hodgson v.
Barge, Waggoner & Sumner, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 842, 845 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) (holding that the
violation was not willful even though the Labor Department had conducted previous investi-
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Fifth Circuit, its application has grown even more expansive. A district court in Florida, for example, applied the three-year limitation
to an employer who "had reason to know the Act was in the picture',
because he had dealt with lawyers and accountants in his business. 10
The Fifth Circuit itself held that a defendant's violation was willful
because he "had 'heard talk' that recent amendments had extended
coverage to those in the position of his employees.,, 11 Indeed, in
Hodgson v. Heard, 12 a district court in Georgia concluded that Jiffy
June "subjects all but the most ignorant unsophisticated businessman to the three-year statute." 13
Not all courts, however, have accepted this broad reading of the
FLSA. Four district courts in the Tenth Circuit and one district
court in the Seventh Circuit have approached willfulness more restrictively, 14 arguing that
gations of the defendant's records), '!,(fd., 477 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1973). For decisions in the
Eighth Circuit applying the Jilfy June test, see Herman v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.,
432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1977), '!,(fd., 569 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 410 F. Supp. 84, 102 (N.D. Iowa 1976) (holding that "the company was
acutely aware of [the FLSA's] provisions. Accordingly, . . . the Court holds that the threeyear limitations period for willful violations shall govern . . ."). For decisions in the Eighth
Circuit applying the minority standard, see Usery v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 35, 45 n.5 (D.N.D.
1977) (''To hold that knowledge on the part of Defendant that the Fair Labor Standards Act
governed its conduct . . . necessarily means Defendant acted 'willfully' in violating the Equal
Pay Act would be harsh, and would seem to go beyond what Congress had in mind when it
added the 'willful' provisions ...") (emphasis in original).
10. Marshall v. Suicide Prevention, 82 Lab. Cas. 47,960, 47,966-67 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
11. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d I, 3 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. 69 Lab. Cas. 45,598, 45,600 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
13. 69 Lab. Cas. at 45,600. For additional Fifth Circuit cases applying the Jilfy June test,
see Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443,
448-49 (5th Cir.) (holding that central office memoranda advising district managers of the
implementation of the Equal Pay Act amendment to the FLSA established that the defendant
knew that "the FLSA was in the picture"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Brennan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d 825, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that previous
investigations by the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department indicated that the
employer knew that "the FLSA was in the picture"); Marshall v. A & M Consol. Indep. School
Dist., 81 Lab. Cas. 47,869, 47,873 (S.D. Tex. 1977), (holding that "for a violation to be willful it
is not necessary that the employer know that his actions were contrary to the requirements of
the Fair Labor Standards Act"), '!,(fd., 605 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Suicide Prevention, 82 Lab. Cas. 47,960 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Hodgson v. Eunice Superette, Inc., 368 F. Supp.
639,644 (W.D. La. 1973); Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886,897 n.17 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (testimony by the defendant's sports editor that he suspected that the plaintiff was
preparing a case to take before the Wage and Hour Division established that defendant knew
that "the FLSA was in the picture"); Hodgson v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 351 F. Supp.
741, 747 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("(d]efendants' 'history' of investigations under and violations of the
Act" demonstrated that they knew "the Act was in the picture"), modffeed 011 other grounds, 482
F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. For Tenth Circuit cases applying this interpretation, see Marshall v. McAlester Corp.,
438 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D. Okla. 1977); Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and
Hour Cas. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1973); Hodgson v. Perkins, 63 Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M.
1970); Wirtz v. Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,669 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
But see Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 949 (D. Colo. 1979)
(citing the J!!Jj, June test as the applicable standard). The Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted a
particular test for willfulness. In Hodgson v. Cactus Craft, 481 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1973),
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[t]he word "willful" ... as used in the ... Act retains its traditional
meaning that violations of the Act must be deliberate, voluntary and
intentional. . . . One is not willful if he merely has knowledge of the
provisions of the Act. There must be action taken on the basis of that
knowledge which intentionally violates the Act. 15•
Under this test, the court asks not whether the employer knew
that the FLSA was "in the picture," but whether the employer realized that he was violating the FLSA or whether the employer's conduct was "marked by careless disregard" of the FLSA. 16 Simple
negligence is not enough to constitute willfulness. 17 Indeed, an employer's good faith vet non often determines which limitation should
apply. 18 Courts using this approach also consider whether the employer had to resolve complex legal issues to determine the lawfulness of his employment practices. 19 They are thus reluctant to
impose a three-year limitation unless the employer actually knew he
was violating the Act.
Although Congress never explicitly stated the purpose of the willfulness provision, the history of the 1966 Amendments - which created the two-tiered limitations structure - gives several clues to the
federal policies at stake. The first FLSA statute of limitations was a
congressional response to a line of cases in the 1940s, in which the
Supreme Court had found that workers in certain industries were
entitled under the FLSA to more compensation than they had rethe court held that the defendant had willfully violated the FLSA in view of three previous
Labor Department investigations of the defendant's employment practices and the defendant's
unkept promises of future compliance. The court did not, however, advance a willfulness test
nor did it cite any case law support. In Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), the court did "not reach the question of exactly what conduct constitutes a willful
violation ... because the issue [was] not appropriate for summary judgment."
The District of Columbia Circuit has proposed a third test. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), the court held that
an employer's violation is willful "when he is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that he
may be subject to the statutory requirements and fails to take steps reasonably calculated to
resolve the doubt." The court noted that "the same conclusion follows when an equally aware
employer consciously and voluntarily charts a course which turns out to be wrong." The court
then reasoned that "in situations of that sort, 'the act [is] deliberate, voluntary and intentional
as distinguished from one committed through inadvertence, accidentally or by ordinary negligence.' " However, only one subsequent case has applied this standard. Nitterright v. Claytor,
454 F. Supp. 130, 139 (D.D.C. 1978).
For a district court decision in the Seventh Circuit applying the minority rule, see
Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
15. Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871, 876 (E.D. Tenn.
1973), qffd., 509 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1975).
16. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390,393 (N.D. Fla. 1970). See Hodgson v. Perkins, 63
Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,670 (W.D.
Okla. 1968).
18. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 574,577 (D. Kan.
1973).
19. See Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D. Okla. 1977).
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ceived.20 Hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of claims were filed
under the FLSA after these decisions. 21 In response to these claims,
Congress declared in the Portal to Portal Act of 1947 that the courts
had wrongly interpreted the FLSA to impose "unexpected liabilities,
immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers." 22
In addition, Congress found "that the varying and extended periods
of time for which, under the laws of the several States, potential retroactive liability may be imposed upon employers, have given and
will give rise to great difficulties in the sound and orderly conduct of
business and industry."23 Congress therefore established a two-year
statute of limitations for all claims under the FLSA,24 declaring that
this would eliminate the "lack of uniformity throughout the Nation."25
In 1965, the administration introduced a bill that would have extended the limitation period to three years. 26 Secretary of Labor
Wirtz testified before the House Subcommittee on Labor that the
purpose of the proposed change was to "allow workers more time to
familiarize themselves with their legal right to back wages." 27 The
Committee, however, reacted by proposing - without explanatory
comment28 - the present two-tiered limitation scheme. 29
It seems clear that, by creating the willfulness requirement in this
context, Congress sought a fair balance between Secretary Wirtz's
concerns and a desire not to unduly burden small businesses that
were honestly trying to comply with the FLSA. Other provisions in
the 1966 Amendments extended the reach of the FLSA, largely by
20. In Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944), the Supreme Court held
that underground iron ore miners were entitled under the FLSA to be paid for time spent
traveling between the portal or entrance of the mine and the working area. The miners had
previously been compensated for only the time they spent at the working area. The Supreme
Court later extended its holding to cover bituminous coal miners and pottery plant employees.
See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945);
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
21. An estimated 395,223 employees filed suit under the FLSA, claiming a total of
$775,705,800. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in (1947] U.S. CooE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1029, 1031.
22. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § l, 29 U.S.C. § 25l(a) (1976).
23. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § l, 29 U.S.C. § 25l(a) (1976).
24. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 6, 61 Stat. 87-88 (1947) (current version at 29
u.s.c. § 255 (1976)).
25. H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in (1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 1029, 1035.
26. H.R. 8259, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Minimum Wage-Hour Amendments: Hearings on R.R. 8259 Before the General Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on R.R. 8259].
27. Id at 11.
28. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966); S. REP. No. 1487, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 64, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3002, 3037.
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lowering the minimum gross sales requirement for employers from
$1,000,000 to $500,000 in 1967 and to $250,000 in 1969.3° Census
reports showed that, in the retail business alone, at least 62,100 companies then had gross sales between $250,000 and $1,000,000. 31
Congress was concerned that these small businesses would have difficulty complying "with the restrictions . . . in some 300 pages of
rules, regulations and interpretations" accompanying the FLSA. 32
Subcommittee testimony forged the link between those concerns and
the proposed three-year limitation period. Representatives of the
National Retail Merchants Association testified that "[t]he addition
of a year to the statute of limitations would merely serve to increase
the period during which employers are subject to harassment with
respect to technical violations." 33 And members of the American
Bankers Association declared:
[F]rom the employer's side the change would make a difference of a
SO-percent increase in his unknown liabilities, and for small businesses
that is a big difference. Extending the statute of limitation would impose an unnecessary potential burden on thousands of small conc~ms
that are honestly trying to live up to the laws and regulations, but because of the variety of possible interpretations have, in good faith, arrived at a conclusion different than one subsequently arrived at by the
Wage-Hour inspector.34

Moreover, House members heard testimony that many FLSA violations are inadvertent: "[I]t is not uncommon for an employer to
find that actions, which he sincerely believed were in full compliance
with the mandate of the act, have become violations . . . ." 35 As
Judge Spottswood Robinson of the D.C. Circuit later opined, "There
is ample room . . . for an informed belief that, with the amendments' broad expansion of the Act's coverage and resultant concern
over the effect on the small businessman, an unqualified increase of
the limitation period would bear too heavily upon an inevitably
larger group of excusably inadvertent violators." 36
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1976).
31. See S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (statement of Senator Fannin) reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3044.
32. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (statement of Senator Fannin), reprinted in
[1966] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3043. See Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, 533-34
(statement of Lawrence Leyton, National Retail Merchants Association).
33. Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, at 534 (statement of Lawrence Leyton, National
Retail Merchants Association).
34. Id at 2250 (statement of the American Bankers Association).
35. Id at 2241-42 (statement of the American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages).
36. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See Hearings on R.R. 8259, supra note 26, at 54 (Repre~
sentative Martin questioning Secretary of Labor Wirtz):
Mr. Martin. [Y]ou have extended the 2-year statute of limitations to 3 years. Now, isn't it
true that most of the violations that you have run into have not been deliberate violations
of the law?
Sec. Wirtz. That is correct.
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The language of the new limitations provision reflects these concerns. Its linguistic structure suggests that the three-year limitations
period was intended to be the exception and not the rule:
Any action . . . may be commenced within two years after the cause of
action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except
that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. 37

The J!lfy June standard, however, turns that suggestion on its head.
Indeed, of the twenty-five cases to apply the J!lfy June test, only one
found an employer's violation to be nonwillful. 38 The Fifth Circuit
seems to have designed the test so as to effectively eliminate the twoyear limitation from the FLSA, 39 thus decreasing the incentive for
employers to make honest efforts at compliance with the Act.
Consider the facts of two key Fifth Circuit opinions. In J!lfy
June, the defendant contended that his violation was not willful because he had asked his lawyer whether the proposed agreement
would violate the FLSA and was told that it would not. 40 The court
rejected this argument, concluding that allowance of such a defense
would permit employers to avoid the three-year limitations period
too easily.41 Indeed, the court noted that the defendant's consultation with his lawyer indicated that he knew "that the FLSA had to
Mr. Martin. Why make a change here from 2 to 3 years on your statute of limitations?
You haven't any difficulty so far; have you?
Sec. Wirtz. There is difficulty. . . . There will come to my attention frequently situations
in which there has been a violation, and cases in which there will not be repayment voluntarily, and in which the repayment is barred because of the 2-year statute of limitations.
That does seem unfair.
Mr. Martin. You have run into that situation quite frequently, have you, or is it just
isolated cases?
Sec. Wirtz. You are right in suggesting that in most cases there will be inadvertence as far
as the violation is concerned, and also voluntary repayment, but there remain a substantial number of cases in which whether as a result of inadvertence or intention, the employer will have violated the law, and in which he will not voluntarily go back beyond the
2 years. On every one of those cases, this problem would arise, and that is a substantial
number.
I think we could give you some statistical suggestion of that from our records. It is not
a matter of small consequence, but rather, of large consequence, and the 3-year rule, as
you know, is a kind of general average among the States for statutes of limitations on
matters of this sort, so this would bring it in line with the general statute of limitations in
civil and related matters.
Mr. Martin. I was hoping we could be a little different in this legislation.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976) (emphasis added).
38. See Marshall v. Debord, 84 Lab. Cas. 48,471, at 48,479 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (the defendant operated an institution for the sick, the aged, and the mentally ill or defective. The court
found that the defendant was not aware that he was subject to the provisions of the Act).
39. Only the most unsophisticated employer would not suspect that his employment practices might be governed by the FLSA. See, e.g., Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co.,
407 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (W.D. Ky. 1975), remanded on other grounds, 565 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.
1977).
40. 458 F.2d at l14l.
41. 458 F.2d at I 141-42.
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be considered," and thus supported the conclusion that his violation
was willful. 42 In Brennan v. Heard, 43 on the other hand, the court
found an employer's violation willful because he had "heard talk"
that the FLSA covered his employees, even though he had not
sought professional advice on the matter. The court held: "Defendant's unwillingness to make further inquiries and to determine the
exact parameters of his statutory obligation affords him no protection. An ostrichlike cultivation of ignorance has never been considered a defense to liability for willful violation of the Act." 44 Thus,
under this test, an employer who suspects that his employees may be
covered by the FLSA is in a no-win position. If he seeks professional advice, he reveals that he knew "the FLSA was in the picture."45 But if he does not seek professional advice, his "ostrichlike
behavior" can only be evidence of bad faith-indirect proof that his
original violation was willful.46
A more restrictive interpretation of willfulness frees the employer
from this dilemma. For example, the Tenth Circuit's test (requiring
intent to violate the FLSA) punishes only the evil or reckless employer. Mere awareness of the Act's existence does not make a violation willful; the employer must either act on the basis of that
knowledge to intentionally violate the FLSA47 or act in "careless disregard" of its provisions.48 An employer would thus have an incentive to determine his statutory obligations, so that he could later
demonstrate his "honest belief that [he] was not within the scope of
the Act."49 Indeed, an employer's failure to investigate his status
would be evidence of "careless disregard" of the FLSA tending to
support a finding of willfulness. so
Such an approach has the additional advantage of giving meaning to the bifurcated limitations laid down by Congress. It does not
effectively eliminate the two-year statute of limitations; in nine of the
fourteen cases applying this test, courts have found FLSA violations
to be nonwillful.51 This conforms with the statutory suggestion that
42. 458 F.2d at 1142.
43. 491 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1974)44. 491 F.2d at 3.
45. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sam Dell's Dodge Corp., 451 F. Supp. 294, 304-05 (N.D.N.Y.
1978).
46. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
47. See, e.g., Brennan v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 871, 876
(E.D. Tenn. 1973).
48. Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
49. Hodgson v. Unified School Dist., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1973).
50. See, e.g., Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
51. For cases holding violations nonwillful, see Usery v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 35, 45
(D.N.D. 1977); Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1005, IOI I (E.D. Okla. 1977);
Bishop'v. Jellelf Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D.D.C. 1975); Hodgson v. Unified School
Dist., 21 Wage and Ho~r Cas. 574,577 (D. Kan. 1973); Hodgson v. Barge, Waggoner & Sum-
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the three-year statute of limitations should be the exception and not
the rule. 52 Most important, application of the minority standard is
consistent with Congress's intent to protect excusably inadvertent violators from the more burdensome three-year statute. 53 In each of
the nine cases holding that the employer's violation was nonwillful,
the court found that the employer had honestly tried to comply with
the FLSA.54 Yet in each of these cases, a court applying the Jiffy
June test would have found these inadvertent violations to be willful, since the employers had realized that "the FLSA was in the picture." Finally, the Tenth Circuit's approach also conforms with
judicial interpretations of the term "willful," as used in other civil
statutes. Generally willful means intentional. 55 As the Supreme
Court has said, willful "often denotes that which is 'intentional, or
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental,' and . . . is
employed to characterize 'conduct marked by careless disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act.' " 56 Even the Fifth Circuit
has endorsed such an interpretation, holding that willful, as used in
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, means "voluntary
action, done either with an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, the requirements of the statute." 5_7 Nothing in the language
ner, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 842, 845 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Hill v. Moss-American, Inc., 63 Lab. Cas.
44,360 at 44,361; Hodgson v. Perkins, 63 Lab. Cas. 44,393, 44,394 (D.N.M. 1970); Wirtz v.
Greenhaw Supermarket, Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,668, 43,669 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
For cases holding violations willful, see Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465,
480-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1194 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257,264 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390,393 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 1276, 1281 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
53. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,460 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. de11ied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
54. See note 51 supra.
55. For decisions holding that willful means intentional in other federal statutes not defining willful, see, e.g., Western Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 476 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir.)
(holding that a willful violation of OSHA requires a " 'knowing, conscious, and deliberate
flaunting of the Act'"), cert. de11ied, 439 U.S. 965 (1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F.
Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding that under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), which prescribes liquidated damages for willful violations, willful refers to "conduct that is intentional, knowing and voluntary, as distinguished
from conduct that is accidental or unknowing"); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engr. Co., 404
F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1975) (the word willful in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act "must be construed in the civil sense. It therefore applies to violations which are intentional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental . . ."), cert. de11ied, 434 U.S.
1022 (1978); Guthrie v. 1Jnited States, 316 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (holding that
willful, as used in I.R.C. § 6672, prescribing civil penalties for willful violations, "refers to
'voluntary, conscious and intentional' "); Datlof v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 11, 33 (E.D.
Pa.) (holding that under the Internal Revenue Code "in civit cases •.. the word 'willful'
means intentional, knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental"), affd, 370 F.2d
655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 906 (1967).
56. United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938).
57. Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309,319 (5th Cir. 1979). The court did note,
however, that the meaning of willful may vary with the context in which it is used.

February 1980]

Note -

FLSA Wil!fulness

635

'of the FLSA or its history suggests that Congress intended to use this
standard term in a new or special way.
Any statute of limitations that depends upon willfulness presents
problems of interpretation. Yet these difficulties should not drive
courts to twist the word's meaning or to ignore expressions of intent.
The Jiffy June standard of willfulness not only ignores congressional
intent, but also unnecessarily burdens those employers who sincerely
try to comply with the FLSA. It effectively rewrites the statute-oflimitations provision by making the three-year period the rule and
the two-year period the exception. If such an interpretation were
essential to fulfill the goals of the FLSA, it might be defensible. Yet,
as we have seen, the Tenth Circuit's standard seems more likely to
promote compliance with the Act since it rewards good faith. It is
both fairer and more effective. The Fifth Circuit and the other
courts following Jiffy June should reconsider their positions.

